Egypt's potential currency crisis

Reuters:  Egypt starts currency auctions, says reserves critical

"Egypt's central bank introduced a new auction system for buying and selling U.S. dollars to help conserve foreign reserves, which it said had reached a critical level...Reserves fell by 448 million USD in November to 15.04 billion USD, enough to cover barely three months of imports, and bankers said the rush to buy dollars was certain to have drained foreign reserves even further in December. The bank is expected to report December figures in the first week of January."

The Daily News Egypt:  Rebel Economy   - a good summary of the monetary situation in Egypt.  
"Although Egypt officially floated the pound in 2003, it has a policy of managing the pound in what is known as a “managed float rate regime”. That means that the currency rate fluctuates, but is ultimately managed by the Central Bank of Egypt through capital controls and trading of foreign currencies. The Central Bank’s primary tool of supporting the domestic currency is by using the country’s reserves of foreign currency. In short, it has to be willing to meet all of the offers to sell Egyptian pounds at the established rate to keep it at the level it wants.  That means the pound’s nominal exchange rate has remained almost unchanged since 2004...So, what’s the problem?  The Central Bank cannot carry on using its foreign reserves for much longer.  The Central Bank’s policy has led to a rapid decrease in foreign reserves to just 15.04bn USD from 36bn USD in late 2010, a dangerously low level that is just enough to cover three months worth of imports.  The two most important sources of foreign currency (which would normally keep foreign reserves replenished), tourism and foreign direct investment, have dried up because of Egypt’s economic crisis."

Question:  Are we observing a "first generation" currency crisis or a "second generation" currency crisis?  See here

" The 'first generation' of models of currency crises began with Paul Krugman's adaptation of Stephen Salant and Dale Henderson's model of speculative attacks in the gold market.[3] In his article,[4] Krugman argues that a sudden speculative attack on a fixed exchange rate, even though it appears to be an irrational change in expectations, can result from rational behavior by investors. This happens if investors foresee that a government is running an excessive deficit, causing it to run short of liquid assets or "harder" foreign currency which it can sell to support its currency at the fixed rate. Investors are willing to continue holding the currency as long as they expect the exchange rate to remain fixed, but they flee the currency en masse when they anticipate that the peg is about to end.

The 'second generation' of models of currency crises starts with the paper of Obstfeld (1986).[5] In these models, doubts about whether the government is willing to maintain its exchange rate peg lead to multiple equilibria, suggesting that self-fulfilling prophecies may be possible, in which the reason investors attack the currency is that they expect other investors to attack the currency."

It looks pretty first generation to me.  Stopping a second generation crisis requires an "exchanger" of last resort.  A player big enough to maintain the exchange rate at its current level or punish those who try to attack the currency by pushing it against them.  Even if this player never ends up actually being called on to support the currency against an attack, his presence should act to prevent the attack int he first place.  A first generation crisis is a bit more difficult to stop because it is not due only to expectations.